This approach has not yet been fully tested as concerns our obligations to future generations. The subject has barely started to excite academic research (but is already showing its many philosophical difficulties). On the level of politics and public debate, the conviction that we have duties towards the future forms the unquestioned, but therefore largely unexamined rationale of the struggle for ecological conservation. Theological approaches, on the other hand, may be tempted to drown the topic in a plea for new ways of relating to cosmic reality. In this paper, I argue that our obligations towards the future must find a firm basis in social ethics: those obligations have to do, in the first place, with our conception of the just society. What moral forces can help us to enlarge the time horizon of that conception? At a later stage, I suggest that the environmental context (which I address all along) creates an additional challenge: it forces us to think on a global level. Fundamental questions concerning the meaning of human history, which go beyond social ethics, then come into their own.

A challenge for social ethics

A difficult subject: deciding for baseline ethics

2. Obligations to future generations is a quite recent subject in political and ethical theory. It is probably fair to say that John Rawls' "Theory of justice" (1971) marked its initiation as a topic of salient philosophical interest. The threats to the future from population and pollution have given it added urgency. But the subject of justice over time has shown itself to be an extremely difficult one. As two recent commentators put it, the inquiries of political theory have taken place in the past (and most do at present) "within the grossly simplifying assumptions of a timeless world." [Peter Laslett & James S.Fishkin (eds.), Justice between age groups and generations. Yale University press 1992, p.1.] But can these assumptions be dispensed with? "It has never been usual, and it is certainly not easy, to think in terms of duration when considering issues of ethical and political theory. Paradox or even absurdity is never far beneath the surface." [Ibid. p.6.] "Principles of justice, equality and utility that yield reasonable conclusions for fixed population sizes over short periods begin to produce bizarre results once cohort sizes or total populations sizes or both vary over time. The implicit contractual relations among generations fail for the same reason." Paradox also invades our daily policies." Over long periods of time the standard practice of discounting leads us to value one life now more than millions in the distant future -- even when we are quite sure of the danger posed by nuclear wastes, for example, to lives in the distant future." [Ibid. p.1.]  It should not come as a surprise that treatment of the subject shows widely different outcomes. I also attribute its controversial character to its capacity of drawing out one's basic views on what morals and society are about in the first place.

The commentators just cited go on to remark that "[it] would be...both unconstructive and irresponsible to wait for a wholly new model of inquiry to be brought into being. Since answers are required of us now, we must do what we can with instruments whose inadequacies and capacity to mislead have been recognized and allowed for." [Ibid.p.11.] In other words, what we want is a "morale provisoire" as the French would call it, which gives due warning of its intrinsic limitations. We must have a baseline ethics dealing with the most urgent problems. Since answers are required of us now, those ethics must be inspired by the intuitive and quite pre-theoretical conviction we already have and which makes us look for answers in the first place: the conviction that it is a matter of basic equity not to leave a plundered planet to our descendants. [N.B. John Rawls says in his "Theory of justice" that it is a matter of sound ethical theory to strive for a "reflective equilibrium" between our considered judgments and the principles we feel we are committed to when we are asked to give a coherent account of our moral convictions. So those moral intuitions we already have and which we cannot easily put aside call for the philosopher's respect.] I find it difficult to follow certain philosophers in the utilitarian tradition who define the subject as one of maximizing happiness through time, on the purely theoretical ground that such a maximizing strategy reflects the point of morals as they see it. Without discussing that theory here, I would suggest that dogmatic adherence to it can make us miss the moral priorities. It is primarily justice we are pursuing (rather than maximizing welfare, an ecologically doubtful proposition anyway). The moral priority is one of distribution, not of global maximization. What we are thinking of, intuitively, is a minimum resource base to which all successive generations have an equal entitlement. One writer suggests that it is an intergenerational equality of opportunity we are aiming for. [Brian Barry, Circumstances of justice and future generations, in Obligations to future generations, Barry & Sikora (eds.), Philadelphia 1978. See p.243: "[What] justice requires...is that the overall range of opportunities open to successor generations should not be narrowed. If some openings are closed off by depletion or other irreversible damage to the environment, others should be created...to make up."]

Such baseline ethics certainly have their limitations. They do not touch upon many aspects of intergenerational relations and the duties they formulate consist in avoiding grave harm rather than in following some ideal of moral benevolence. But this has its advantages. It is often easier to tell what harming somebody means than to know positively what it is good for him or her. Baseline ethics avoid the vexing problem of having to positively define the right measure of personal or collective altruism within the dimension of time. As Rawls says, "[how] the burden of capital accumulation and of raising the standard of civilization and culture is to be shared between generations seems to admit of no definite answer." [John Rawls, A theory of justice, Oxford University Press 1971, p.286.]  But he goes on to state that it does not follow "that certain bounds which impose significant constraints cannot be formulated." Rawls still defined these bounds in the pre-ecological terms of a "just savings principle" which did not stipulate determinate burdens, but sought to put their definition within a framework of intergenerational impartiality. In considering the present world, these bounds must be found in conserving an ecological resource base to which future generations have an equal right. Thus justice calls for more than a just procedure, it also aims at a determinate entitlement. The firmness of this claim enables us to speak of obligations on our part, and to quell any doubts concerning the relevance of justice, "the most public and the most legal of the virtues" [H.L.A.Hart, The concept of law, 1961, p.163.], in the context we are dealing with. Certainly terms like "minimum resource base," "equality of opportunity" etc., may suggest a conceptual clarity which does not yet exist. Many questions of a scientific, economic or cultural nature have to be answered first, and one is plagued by the difficulty of looking far into the future. [N.B. I am clear that this undermines the baseline character of the ethical approach I describe here. What level of culture should we contemplate when trying to determine basic ecological needs? What importance should we give to purely recreational of aesthetic values? etc. Answering those questions goes beyond reasoning in terms of biological necessities. ]  Nor do I want to overlook the dramatic incidence of the world population problem on the whole issue being discussed. The notion of a determinate entitlement thus may seem far-fetched. But moral claims cannot be put aside just because they are hard to determine in practice. It is clear that the moral temper of our search for sustainable policies is one of equal distribution of ecological resources through time, on the basis of an impartial assessment of all relevant criteria. And this is quite enough to be sure about the harmfulness of many practices we engage in today.

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